Word meaning, what is said and explicature by Carston, RA
1 
 
Word Meaning, What is Said, and Explicature
*
 
 
Robyn Carston 
Linguistics, University College London, and 
Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo  
 
 
1. Background: what is said, what is meant and what is explicitly communicated  
 
In his logic of conversation, Paul Grice made an important distinction between two kinds 
of act that speakers may perform when uttering a sentence and, correspondingly, two 
kinds or levels of speaker meaning: (i) saying, hence what is said, and (ii) implicating, 
hence what is implicated (implicature) (Grice 1975). The distinction between what is said 
and what is implicated can be seen as one instantiation of a distinction between the explic-
it content of an utterance and its implicit import. This distinction, albeit with numerous 
modifications and extensions, has proved indispensable to all subsequent attempts to ac-
count for speaker meaning, communicated content and utterance interpretation.  
 It is generally agreed, however, that in his few characterisations of ‘what is said’, 
Grice underestimated the extent to which context/pragmatics can contribute to a hearer’s 
recovery of this level of content. He maintained that ‘what someone has said [is] closely 
related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered’ (1975: 44), 
and, beyond conventional linguistic meaning, he explicitly acknowledged only the need to 
identify the reference of pronouns, the time of utterance, and the intended sense of any 
ambiguous words or phrases (1975: 44). In the meantime, a plethora of linguistic phenom-
ena has been put forward as requiring or, at least, allowing for further contextu-
al/pragmatic effects at the level of explicit utterance content. These include the following: 
(i) cases of syntactically complete but semantically non-propositional sentences, e.g. ‘Jane 
is ready’, ‘Bill is tall enough’; (ii) cases of (apparently) unarticulated constituents of con-
tent, e.g. the location constituent usually inferred for utterances of ‘It is raining’, the 
cause-consequence constituent often inferred for conjunctive utterances such as ‘Jane did 
Bill’s lectures and he recommended her for promotion’; (iii) the modulation of word 
meaning, e.g. colour terms as in ‘red bird’, ‘red house’, ‘red pen’, ‘red crystal’, ‘red hair’, 
and so on; (iv) more controversially, certain kinds of non-literal uses (metaphorical or 
metonymic) of words, e.g. ‘John is a saint’, ‘Mary is a butterfly’, ‘The mushroom omelette 
wants her bill’.  
 It has been suggested that, if he had considered the matter in more detail, Grice 
would not have been averse to including at least some of these kinds of pragmatic contri-
butions in what is required for a full identification of what the speaker has said (Wharton 
2002, Stephen Neale (pc)). This may be so for semantically incomplete sentences as in (i) 
above: Grice might have agreed to add to what is required for a full identification of what 
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the speaker has said the answers to such questions as ‘ready to do what?’, ‘tall enough for 
what purpose?’. However, several other aspects of his work strongly indicate that he 
would not have made any substantial move in this contextualist/pragmaticist direction: (a) 
he was well aware of many of the phenomena now treated as pragmatic contributions to 
explicitly communicated content, e.g. the various non-truth-functional enrichments of con-
junctions and disjunctions, cases of scalar inference and the referential use of definite de-
scriptions, and he explicitly analysed them as cases of conversational implicatures (Grice 
1975, 1978); (b) for metaphor and other non-literal uses, he again took an implicature ap-
proach and, most tellingly, moved to talk of ‘making as if to say’ rather than allow any-
thing other than literal word meanings to enter into ‘what is said’; and (c) the whole moti-
vation for his saying/implicating distinction was to keep meaning (semantics) distinct 
from use (pragmatics) and to ensure that judgements of truth/falsity were confined to the 
former (Grice 1967/89: 3-21; for discussion of this point, see Carston 2002: 101-105). 
What Grice wanted from his notion of ‘what is said’ was that it serve both as the 
semantic content of the sentence uttered and as the proposition asserted (hence meant) by 
the speaker. However, as I’ve argued at length elsewhere, no single level of meaning can 
do double duty as both sentence semantics and speaker-meant primary meaning
1
 (Carston 
2004; Carston & Hall 2012). This is evident in the work of virtually all those who see 
themselves as, in some sense, following, developing or reacting to this area of Grice’s 
thinking. His notion of ‘what is said’ has had to be reshaped and, in most instances, split 
into two distinct components, one semantic, the other pragmatic. For instance, Kent Bach 
has opted for a strict semantic notion of ‘what is said’, which is not speaker-meant, and 
has posited a distinct level of speaker-meant content, called ‘impliciture’, which is the re-
sult of pragmatic processes of completion and expansion of the minimal what is said 
(Bach 1994). Francois Recanati and other contextualists maintain a pragmatic notion of 
what is said, which is speaker meant, but accept that this may require much more elabora-
tion and modulation of the linguistic meaning than Grice allowed (Recanati 2004), and 
they generally take it that sentence semantics is much more schematic than Grice envis-
aged.  
 Relevance theorists have argued that Grice’s notion of ‘what is said’ (and the label 
itself) should be dropped as it is an artificial construct that doesn’t pick out any psycholog-
ically real component or level of meaning (Carston 2002, 2004; Wilson & Sperber 2002). 
Like Recanati, they maintain that linguistically-given meaning (semantics) is schematic 
(non-propositional), functioning as evidence for (or constraints on) the propositional con-
tents that a speaker has communicated, and that the primary communicated content which 
a hearer must reconstruct pragmatically from this linguistic basis is generally considerably 
richer than Grice’s ‘what is said’. Sperber & Wilson (1986/95: 182) introduced the term 
‘explicature’ (as a counterpart to ‘implicature’) for this primary component of speaker 
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meaning, which is a pragmatic development of the linguistically decoded content.
2
   
 An utterance of the sentence in (1a) below could have any of indefinitely many 
possible explicatures, depending not only on the intended referents of the pronouns, but 
also on the intended meaning of ‘take’ and the intended completion of ‘enough’. And the 
same goes for (1b) with regard to what is meant by the phrasal verbs ‘get through’ and 
‘take out’ and what the intended completion of ‘get through’ is on a specific occasion of 
use.  
 
(1) a. She has taken enough from him. 
 b. When he gets through she’ll take him out. 
 
The content of explicatures (as derived by hearers) comes from two distinct sources, the 
linguistic expressions used and the context, and it is derived in two distinct ways depend-
ing on its source, by linguistic decoding or by pragmatic inference. It follows that explica-
tures can vary in their degree of explicitness depending on the relative contributions of 
decoding and context, so although an utterance of the sentence in (2) could have the same 
explicature as an utterance of the sentence in (1a), the contribution from linguistic encod-
ing is greater and so it is more explicit: 
 
(2) She has taken enough help from Peter. 
 
 Although context (linguistic and extra-linguistic) plays a substantial role in the rel-
evance-theoretic account (RT), the theory departs from existing ‘contextualist’ positions 
on the issue of how context enters into the derivation of explicatures. For instance, on Re-
canati’s contextualist account, the derivation process is a matter of contextual best fit, 
achieved via direct modulation of linguistically decoded meaning by salient components 
of context (Recanati 2004). On the RT ‘pragmaticist’ account, on the other hand, the 
pragmatic enrichment and adjustment of linguistically provided content involves the exer-
cise of full-blown pragmatic inference
3
 and it is only (what are taken to be) intended con-
textual assumptions that enter into the interpretation process. However, for the purposes of 
this paper, it is what the two approaches share that matters most, that is, the view that 
there is typically a greater gap between linguistically given meaning and the speaker’s 
primary meaning (explicature) than can be bridged by merely fixing the reference of in-
dexicals and disambiguating homonymous lexical forms.  
 The issue I want to consider in this paper concerns the nature of word meaning, in 
particular the standing lexical meaning of words in what are known as the ‘open classes’, 
                                                             
2  Setting aside terminological differences, the three positions just discussed (Bach’s, Recanati’s, RT’s) are 
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a primary speaker meaning, which is the result of pragmatic enrichments and adjustments of the linguistical-
ly provided content, and secondary speaker meaning(s), which are wholly pragmatic inferred (implicatures).  
3  By ‘full-blown pragmatic inference’, I mean the process of drawing sound conclusions from a set of prem-
ises, which may include premises concerning mental states of the speaker (her beliefs, intentions), rather 
than simply associative mappings and concept activation. For more on the distinction between contextualism 
and pragmaticism, see Carston (2009), and for a critique of some ways in which ‘context’ is invoked in ac-
counts of pragmatic enrichment, see Bach (2005).    
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specifically, nouns, verbs, and adjectives. The general linguistic underdeterminacy claim 
concerns the relation between the explicature a speaker expresses by her use of a sentence 
on a particular occasion and the (standing, invariant) meaning of the sentence within the 
language. The move now is to consider the relation between the concept a speaker ex-
presses by her use of a word on a particular occasion and the stable meaning that the word 
has as a lexical item in the language. The central question to be addressed is whether 
words encode concepts, hence the same kind of entity as they are used to express, or 
something more schematic, like a blueprint or template for concept construction. If it turns 
out that the latter is the case, then we would have a nice parallel between words and sen-
tences, both of them underdetermining of what they are used by speakers to express. I 
don’t have a definitive answer to offer to the difficult question of what context-
independent word meaning consists of, but will provide some considerations that support 
the position that word meaning, like sentence meaning, is inevitably underdetermining of 
what it expresses and that it is different in kind (it is non-conceptual).  
 The second question is what view of standing word meaning is to be expected or 
preferred within the relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation. According to 
this account, word meanings are pragmatically modulated in context, resulting in ad hoc 
concepts which are components of the conceptual representation recovered by the hearer 
as the proposition explicitly communicated by the speaker (the explicature). I will argue 
that, while minimalist propositional views of semantics (including Grice’s semantic con-
ception of ‘what is said’) seem to require that word meanings are fully conceptual, the 
pragmaticist position of RT does not require this and seems in many respects better served 
by a more schematic view of encoded word meanings.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the account of 
word meaning in current relevance theory, both its view of encoded (or ‘standing’) word 
meaning and its account of ‘lexical pragmatics’, according to which a word often contrib-
utes not its encoded meaning but an ad hoc concept to the explicature. In sections 3 and 4, 
which are the core of the paper, I set out some arguments against construing encoded word 
meanings as concepts and outline some psycholinguistic evidence which supports an un-
derspecification view. Then, in section 5, after a brief look at the account of word meaning 
entailed by semantic minimalist accounts, I return to the relevance-theoretic account of 
word meaning and suggest that it should embrace a non-conceptual position. Finally, in 
the conclusion, section 6, I relate the position on word meaning taken here to a broader 
stance concerning the inevitability of linguistic underdetermination of speaker meaning 
and the impossibility of ‘saying’ what one means.  
 
 
2. Relevance theory: word type meaning and occasion-specific word meaning 
 
A distinction between two kinds of word type meaning (or lexical semantic encoding
4
) is 
made in relevance theory: conceptual encoding and procedural encoding (Blakemore 
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1987, 2002; Wilson & Sperber 1993; Wilson 2011). Diane Blakemore first introduced the 
idea of procedural meaning in the context of a class of terms she called discourse connec-
tives, e.g. ‘but’, ‘moreover’, ‘after all’, ‘so’, ‘you see’, which arguably do not contribute to 
the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur. She claimed that the lexi-
cally encoded meaning of such words is not a concept (a component of content) but rather 
a constraint on the kind of pragmatic inferential process the hearer is to undertake in deriv-
ing the speaker’s meaning. Since that early work of hers, the notion of procedural meaning 
has been developed and the range of linguistic elements it is claimed to apply to has been 
extended (e.g. pronouns, particles, tense, aspect and mood markers, and interjections have 
all been claimed to encode procedures). My focus in this paper is on those words that are 
taken to encode concepts, that is, open-class words like nouns, verbs and adjectives, so I 
am mentioning procedural meaning at this stage in order to set it aside, although the no-
tion will reappear in section 5 in the context of a general non-conceptual view of word 
meaning.  
 According to the RT view, the concepts encoded by words (lexical concepts) are 
unstructured, that is, they do not decompose into components that comprise definitions, or 
stereotypical features, or prototypes, and their content is not dependent on their embed-
ding in any theory or system of beliefs. A semantic representation of a natural language 
sentence is a syntactically structured string of atomic (or ‘primitive’) concepts (together 
with some elements of procedural meaning as mentioned above). So, as regards the mean-
ing/semantics of words, the mental lexicon is very minimalist, simply providing mappings 
from lexical forms to simple concepts, e.g. ‘red’ maps to RED; ‘open’ maps to OPEN; ‘cat’ 
maps to CAT, a position that is much akin to Jerry Fodor’s ‘disquotational’ lexicon (Fodor 
1998).
5
  These concepts have a denotation, that is, they refer to entities, properties and ac-
tivities in the mind-external world (e.g. cats, the property of redness, the action of open-
ing) and, as mental representational entities, they play (at least) two roles in our cognitive 
life. They are the basic constituents of our language of thought or Mentalese, the system of 
mental representation in which we think and in which the explicatures and implicatures of 
our utterances are couched. And each such primitive concept (RED, CAT, OPEN, etc.) is a 
storage point for encyclopaedic information,
6
 including general knowledge and individual 
beliefs about the things it denotes, cultural knowledge, including stereotypes, which the 
individual may or may not endorse, imagistic representations, and perhaps also episodic 
memories. (Much more needs to be said about how this information is organised and 
tagged so that general knowledge, stereotypes, individual memories, etc. are kept distinct 
from each other.) Encyclopaedic information, in particular general and cultural 
knowledge, is a major source of contextual assumptions, which play a central role in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
analyses of word meanings. As will be clear, this is not the sort of semantics for words that is advocated 
here.  
5
  However, RT does not fully embrace Fodor’s conceptual atomism because it maintains a partially inferen-
tial role semantics for concepts in the form of meaning postulates such as ‘α RED α  COLOURED’, ‘ϕ CAT ψ 
→ ϕ ANIMAL ψ’ (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/95 and, for a defence of meaning postulates against Fodor’s 
objections, see  Horsey 2006).    
6  There are various metaphors for what this amounts to, including the idea that concepts are addresses in 
memory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95: 86) or labels for files of information.  
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relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation and specifically in the process of 
lexical concept adjustment, which I will go on to outline now. 
 According to recent work on ‘lexical pragmatics’ within relevance theory, a 
word’s meaning may be narrowed or broadened on occasions of use, that is, the concept a 
speaker communicates may be more specific or more general than the concept the word 
encodes (Wilson & Carston 2007). These pragmatically inferred concepts are known as 
‘ad hoc concepts’ in the theory - they are distinct from lexically encoded concepts and are 
occasion-specific. An ad hoc concept derived from an encoded concept is marked with an 
asterisk, e.g. RED* is a concept pragmatically inferred from the lexical concept RED on an 
occasion of use, OPEN* from OPEN, etc. Lexical narrowing and broadening are to be under-
stood in denotational terms, that is, the denotation of the communicated concept may be a 
subset or a superset of the set that comprises the denotation of the encoded concept. A 
combination of the two is also possible so that the denotation of the resulting concept may 
merely overlap with that of the lexical concept. These various outcomes are the result of a 
single process of lexical adjustment that takes place as part of the overall inferential prag-
matic process of utterance interpretation. Consider the following examples, focussing on 
the highlighted word: 
 
(3) a.    There’s milk in the fridge.   
 b.    I’ve given up teaching.  
 c.     Chris ran for Britain. 
 
In appropriate conversational situations, each of these could be understood as communi-
cating a concept which is more specific than the concept it encodes: in (3a), the milk re-
ferred to might have to be of a certain quantity and quality making it suitable for drinking 
or adding to coffee (a few stale drips on a shelf would fall outside the denotation of MILK*, 
the  concept communicated); in (3b), it might be evident that the speaker means she has 
given up classroom teaching (she might still be actively involved in teaching her grand-
children how to make pancakes or her neighbour how to prune a magnolia); in (3c), the 
communicated concept RUN* might denote only those instances of running that meet the 
standards of athletes competing in international races.     
 The sentences in (4) are all instances of literal uses of the transitive verb ‘pass’ 
(without any of the prepositional or adverbial additions that might make for a different 
verb, e.g. ‘pass on’, ‘pass out’, ‘pass away’, pass into’, ‘pass off’, ‘pass over’, ‘pass 
down’, etc.) and yet the concept expressed and understood in each case is likely to be dis-
tinct from the others: 
 
(4) a.    Jack passed a rope around the tree. 
 b.    Jill passed two cars.  
 c.    Jack passed Jill his phone number. 
 d.    The dog passed wind. 
 e.    She passed her exams. 
 f.    Eventually his depression passed. 
 g.    They passed the time happily. 
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If each of these communicates a more specific concept (PASS*, PASS**, PASS***, etc.) than 
the concept PASS encoded by the lexical form ‘pass’, the question that arises is just what 
this more general concept is and whether it is ever communicated. Perhaps what we have 
here is a case of polysemy, that is, of one word with a number of related senses, or of 
some stage prior to semantic polysemy, as it seems unlikely that each of these concepts is 
a fully conventionalised sense which has been incorporated into the lexicon. These and 
other issues raised by this sort of case are considered in more detail in section 3. 
 The following are cases where pragmatic lexical adjustment of the italicised word 
would probably have the opposite result, that is, an ad hoc concept with a broader denota-
tion than the encoded concept:    
 
(5) a.   The children quickly formed a circle. 
b.   This steak is raw.   
 c.   She raced down the street. 
 d.   That lake is an ocean.   
 
If the word ‘circle’ encodes the concept paraphraseable as ‘closed flat curve every point of 
which is equidistant from the centre’ (which might be disputed, of course), then the con-
cept CIRCLE* communicated by an utterance of (5a) is likely to encompass a much broader 
range of shapes. Many precise terms (e.g. words for numbers, geometric shapes, distances, 
and times) are often used in this sort of approximate way. Other words may be used hy-
perbolically in order to have a particular forceful effect, as is very likely the case with 
‘raw’, ‘race’ and ‘ocean’ in (5b)-(5d), and the concepts thereby communicated will clearly 
be broader than the concepts they encode.   
 According to orthodox relevance theory, metaphorical uses of words, as in (6), are 
also cases of concept broadening, so, for instance, the denotation of the concept CIRCU-
LAR* communicated by an utterance of (6a) includes not only instances of a certain kind 
of physical shape but also certain patterns of thoughts and the concept OCEAN* communi-
cated by (6d) would encompass not only large bodies of salt-water but also human feel-
ings of a particular strength and constancy: 
 
(6) a.    Your argument is circular.  
 b.    His grief was still raw. 
 c.    His thoughts were racing. 
 d.    Her love for him was an ocean. 
 
It might well be that this is only part of the story for metaphorical uses, which many theo-
rists think of as involving a domain shift (e.g. from the physical to the psychological) and 
so as involving a denotational narrowing as well as a broadening (or some other process 
altogether). I won’t pursue this issue here,7 as the relevant point for current purposes is the 
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general one: pragmatic lexical adjustments of one sort or another occur frequently within 
the process of utterance understanding and the concept encoded by a lexical form is mere-
ly a clue to (or a constraint on) the intended interpretation.   
 As my main interest in this paper is the nature of encoded word meanings (of open 
class words), that is, the lexical input to the pragmatic process of grasping the concepts 
communicated by speakers’ uses of words, I will not go into the detail of the relevance-
theoretic comprehension process but give here just a very brief sketch of its main compo-
nents (for more thorough accounts, see Wilson & Sperber 2002, 2004, Wilson & Carston 
2007).  
 When a lexical concept is accessed via the usual linguistic decoding process, the 
encyclopaedic information associated with it is activated. Some elements of it are more 
highly activated than others (since there are multiple sources of spreading activation, in-
cluding other concepts encoded in the utterance and conceptual representations derived 
from the wider discourse or situation of utterance). The most highly activated items of 
conceptually represented information are accessed and deployed as contextual assump-
tions in deriving contextual implications, which form an initial interpretive hypothesis 
about the utterance. Then, via a mechanism of mutual parallel adjustment of explicit utter-
ance content (explicature), contextual assumptions and contextual implications, lexical 
concepts in the decoded semantic representation are adjusted by backwards inference, so 
that only implications that are ultimately grounded in the explicature are confirmed. The 
overall interpretation is accepted provided that it meets the addressee’s expectation of rel-
evance. Consider example (3a) ‘There’s milk in the fridge’ uttered in a situation in which 
the speaker and hearer are about to have a cup of coffee. The utterance would have the 
contextual implication that there is milk available to add to their coffee, which would be 
supported by a contextual assumption (a highly accessible item of encyclopaedic infor-
mation) that milk comes in cartons and bottles for a variety of culinary uses including add-
ing to tea and coffee. By backwards inference, the concept MILK* is formed, paraphrasea-
ble as ‘milk of sufficient freshness and quantity to be suitable to add to coffee’ and this 
concept is a component of the explicature. In another utterance situation, for example, one 
in which the hearer is supposed to have meticulously cleaned the fridge, different contex-
tual assumptions and implications (specifically, that there is still some mess to be cleaned 
up) could result in a distinct ad hoc concept MILK**, paraphraseable as ‘drops of stale 
milk’. And there are numerous other possibilities. 
 In the next two sections, I focus on the theory-general question of what sort of 
thing stable (lexicalised) word meanings are, with a view to making a preliminary case for 
their being non-conceptual (non-semantic). I then return to RT in section 5 and argue that 
this non-conceptual view of word meaning is compatible with the theory, perhaps even 
preferable to the conceptual view.  
 
 
3. Words behave as if their meanings are conceptually underspecified 
  
The view that stable (encoded or standing) word meanings are concepts, i.e. mental repre-
sentations with a denotation, is fairly widespread: it is held by philosophers including 
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Fodor (1998), Fodor and Lepore (1998), Borg (2012) and probably others who fall under 
the label of ‘semantic minimalists’, by psychologists including Bloom (2000), Murphy 
(2002) and Hampton (2011), and by relevance-theoretic pragmaticists, as discussed in the 
previous section. Others, mostly linguists, have argued for some kind of semantically un-
derspecified meaning.
8
 These include Charles Ruhl (1989), who advocates the ‘mono-
semic bias’ in the face of words which seem to have many (potentially indefinitely many) 
related senses, a stance that leads inevitably to a take on standing word meanings as un-
derspecified (that is, as not constituted by any one of the specific senses that is expressed 
in use but of something more abstract that is shared by all of them).
9
 In recent work within 
the Dynamic Syntax framework, Ruth Kempson and her colleagues (2011) have character-
ised word type meanings as ‘lexical actions’ or procedures, which together with the in-
structions provided by the syntax of a language constitute a set of mechanisms enabling 
hearers to construct representations of content. That construction process is heavily reliant 
on processes of pragmatic inference, such as those discussed in section 2, with the lexical 
procedures functioning as constraints on inference.  
 The computational linguist, Peter Bosch, maintains that the lexical type meaning of 
many words is underspecified and must be developed at a conceptual/pragmatic level in 
order for its expressed meaning to be recovered by a hearer or processor. The noun ‘nov-
el’, for example, discussed at length in Bosch (2007), can have the following senses: a 
complex of ideas/thoughts (when the author is working on it), a text (when it is complet-
ed), a publication (e.g. when we talk of an author’s most recent novel), a physical object 
(e.g. when we talk of a suitcase full of novels), and certain combinations, e.g. ‘Peter is 
reading the novel he found at the bus-stop’ (text and physical object). No particular one of 
these senses is obviously the encoded meaning or is sufficiently all-encompassing to pro-
vide the basis for pragmatically inferring the other senses. As Bosch says: ‘If we want to 
maintain just one lexical entry for novel it must remain underspecified in many respects 
…’ (2007: 68). He discusses a number of other words of various lexical categories (e.g. 
‘work’, ‘rain’, ‘run’, ‘cut’, ‘open’, ‘fast’) whose susceptibility to being used to express 
different concepts, which he calls ‘contextual concepts’, points to the same conclusion: 
‘the lexical semantics should be left underspecified in these cases’ (2007: 58). However, 
Bosch talks throughout the paper of the stable standing meaning of a word as a lexical 
concept and proposes to follow the ‘disquotational’ view of lexical semantics advocated 
by Fodor & Lepore (1998). In his discussion of the word ‘novel’, for instance, he says:  
‘… the various senses each represent a different view of our underspecified 
concept NOVEL. …. The concept NOVEL may be subsumed by concepts like 
PHYSICAL_OBJECT, TEXT, PUBLICATION, etc. In each such view the resulting 
                                                             
8  A few philosophers also support some kind of underspecification position on word meaning.  Charles 
Travis, famous for demonstrating the different ways in which an unambiguous word (e.g. ‘green’, ‘cover’, 
‘sailor’) may be understood on different occasions of use, talks of words as providing constraints on those 
different understandings (Travis 2000: 221-227). Tim Pritchard is actively engaged in trying to provide an 
account of core stable meanings for words that differ in kind from the senses (concepts) they are used to 
express (Pritchard forthcoming).  
9  Ruhl’s study of the verb ‘bear’, in which he provides a wealth of attested examples, brings out the range of 
fine-grained differences in sense that the verb can be and has been used to express (Ruhl 1989, chapter 2). 
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contextual concepts for novel (in all cases sub-concepts of the lexical concept 
NOVEL) inherit different attributes from the different superconcepts under 
which they are being subsumed.’ (Bosch 2007: 68).  
The idea that underspecified word meanings are lexical concepts raises a question for me. 
While lexical concepts of the Fodorian sort are minimalist in many respects (no internal 
structure, no content-constitutive inferential connections or knowledge structures), they 
are full-fledged concepts nonetheless: they are components of thoughts (‘words’ of Men-
talese) and have a referential semantics. So the question is: what is the lexical concept that 
comprises the stable meaning of a word whose use gives rise to a range of distinct contex-
tual concepts (or ‘ad hoc concepts’, in relevance-theoretic terms)? What concept is the lex-
ical concept NOVEL as distinct from the various contextual concepts NOVEL*, NOVEL**, 
etc.?  These latter concepts are clearly constituents of thoughts that we have and are able 
to communicate, but what about the lexical concept, a concept which is somehow neutral 
as regards novels as physical objects, narratives, texts, publications - does it occur as a 
constituent of a thought, and, if it does, what is that thought about, that is, what is the de-
notation of NOVEL? The same sort of issue arises for every word that can be used to ex-
press myriad different concepts on different occasions: for instance, what is the (alleged) 
general lexical concept OPEN and what is the content of a thought in which such a general 
concept features, as opposed to any of the more specific concepts that we grasp in under-
standing open one’s mouth, open the window, open a letter, open a discussion, etc.?  Find-
ing no ready answer, the question then becomes: is there any definite thought at all that 
engages the general concept or must any thought about opening contain one of the more 
specific concepts? (See Carston 2012 for a little more detail on this point). The difficulty 
in getting any purchase on these questions about underspecified lexical concepts is a first 
indication that we might be well advised to move to a different, non-conceptual (non-
semantic) view on the nature of standing word meanings. As Bosch puts it in a later paper: 
‘… lexical semantics is much less specified than is often assumed and only contains struc-
tural constraints over the kind of conceptual entities that can be denoted by the lexical 
item, but does not contain the conceptual content.’ (Bosch 2009: 99; my emphasis)   
 Sperber and Wilson (1998) maintain that some words do not encode a full-fledged 
concept but what they call a ‘pro-concept’, that is, a meaning or character that functions as 
a constraint on the kind of concept that it can be used to express. What that concept is on 
any occasion of use has to be pragmatically inferred using relevant contextual information. 
They suggest ‘my’, ‘have’, ‘near’, and ‘long’ as likely instances of words that encode pro-
concepts, and say that ‘while each of these examples may be contentious, the existence of 
the general category should not be’ (Sperber & Wilson 1998: 185). Most interestingly, 
they go on to say: ‘… quite commonly, all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts: 
that is, whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a 
given utterance has to be contextually worked out’ and they discuss the verb ‘open’ as a 
case in point: ‘A verb like ‘open’ acts as a pointer to indefinitely many notions or concepts 
...’ (1998: 197). However, they also maintain that the pragmatic process of inferring the 
intended concept in context is optional because ‘it may so happen that the intended con-
cept is the very one encoded by the word,’ (1998: 197). So Sperber and Wilson presup-
11 
 
pose that many words encode concepts
10
 as their standing meaning and may, on occasion, 
contribute the concept they encode directly, without any pragmatic adjustment, to explica-
tures. This view is carried over into more recent RT work on lexical pragmatics too, even 
though this work has led to the claim that ‘… lexical narrowing and broadening (or a 
combination of the two) are the outcomes of a single interpretive process which fine-tunes 
the interpretation of almost every word.’ (Wilson and Carston 2007: 231, my emphasis). If 
words quite generally behave as if they don’t encode concepts, we might wonder why we 
should assume they do encode concepts, as opposed to something more schematic, which 
merely constrains or guides the pragmatic process of recovering the concept a speaker has 
expressed.
11
 
 Any move away from a fully conceptual standing meaning for words will, of 
course, have a range of consequences and raise new questions. One of the most pressing of 
these concerns the pragmatic inferential process of constructing ad hoc (contextual) con-
cepts, a process which would seem to be obligatory if the lexical input is underspecified. 
The question is how, given a starting point that is non-conceptual, hence non-semantic, 
does the pragmatic process result in a semantic (truth-conditional) output.
12
 Confronting 
and answering this question requires more space than I have here and I defer it to a later 
paper.  
 Another possible concern is whether this move might fall foul of the fundamental 
principle that the meaning of the whole (the sentence or thought) should be a determinate 
function of the meanings of the basic constituents (word meanings) and their mode of 
combination, that is, the principle of semantic compositionality. Fodor (1998) maintains 
that this is a non-negotiable requirement on an account of concepts and he has used it as 
the key argument in support of his particular view of lexical concepts as referential atoms 
and against other views of concept content (as prototypes, inferential roles, theories or 
bodies of knowledge/beliefs). The principle is often presented as applying equally to con-
cepts/thoughts and word meanings/sentences, but it is a principle of truth-conditional se-
mantic compositionality, so if sentence meaning is not truth-conditional this particular 
principle of compositionality does not, after all, apply to language. That sentence meaning 
quite generally underdetermines truth-conditional content is a central tenet of contextual-
ism/pragmaticism, as discussed in section 1. In other words, natural language sentences 
are simply not compositional in the required sense, as Fodor himself occasionally 
acknowledges: ‘… a perfectly unelliptical, unmetaphorical, undeictic sentence that is be-
ing used to express exactly the thought that it is conventionally used to express, often 
                                                             
10  This is made especially clear in Wilson (2003: 274; my emphasis): ‘I will adopt a simple model of lin-
guistic semantics that treats words as encoding mentally-represented concepts, elements of a conceptual 
representation system or ‘language of thought’, which constitute their linguistic meanings and determine 
what might be called their linguistically-specified denotations. 
11  Note that a non-conceptual account of the open-class vocabulary will not be one that adopts wholesale 
indexicality (or ‘pro-concepts’, a notion that seems to entail an indexical component). This point is elaborat-
ed on a little in section 5 of the paper.  
12  The lexical concept view of word meaning advocated by Sperber & Wilson, and apparently also by Bosch 
(2007), does not raise this question: the pragmatic adjustment process takes a semantic entity as input (a 
concept) and outputs another semantic entity (a distinct concept). On the face of it, this is a definite ad-
vantage of the conceptual account.  
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doesn’t express the thought that it would if the sentence were compositional ….’ (Fodor 
2001: 12) and he goes on to talk of the typical case of this situation being one in which a 
sentence ‘vastly underdetermines the right thought’, concluding that ‘The evidence strong-
ly suggests that language is not compositional’ (2001: 4). It follows, then, that the primi-
tives of natural languages (words or morphemes) are not bound by the compositionality 
principle that constrains an account of primitive concepts (the ‘words’ or basic compo-
nents of the language of thought). The standing context-invariant meanings of words need 
not contribute thought components (concepts) unmediated by pragmatic processes and 
there is, therefore, no obstacle here to their being some kind of non-conceptual entity, 
which merely places constraints on the concepts that a word can be used to express.  
 There is a further point worth noting, though, concerning the motivation for the 
compositionality requirement. Language and thought both have the properties of ‘produc-
tivity’ (unboundedness of the number of distinct representations they can generate) and 
‘systematicity’ (sameness or overlap of constituent parts of sets of representations, such 
as, for example, the set of thoughts/sentences ‘Dogs chase cats’, ‘Cats chase dogs’, ‘Do 
dogs chase cats?’). It is widely (although not universally) agreed that it is the composi-
tionality of mental and linguistic representations that underlies these two properties (for 
extensive discussion of this point, see Fodor 1998: 94-100; Fodor & Lepore 2002). How-
ever, the (undoubted) productivity and systematicity of a natural language are accommo-
dated by a fairly trivial notion of the compositionality of sentence meanings, one which 
follows directly from its recursive syntax coupled with stable meanings for its primitives 
(words or morphemes). So long as we maintain that sentence meanings are not truth-
conditional entities (thoughts/propositions) and that pragmatics plays an essential role in 
deriving the propositions expressed by speakers, the constraints that productivity and sys-
tematicity (specifically the latter) place on our account of word meaning are meagre: that 
those word meanings are constant wherever they occur in a linguistic representation. As 
far as I can see, there is no reason to suppose that a non-conceptual account of word mean-
ing would be any less able than a conceptual account to meet this requirement.  
 In this section, I have presented some arguments in favour of an account of word 
meanings as underspecified and non-conceptual. None of them provides an overwhelming 
case and the idea needs a great deal more thinking through. However, there is some con-
crete empirical evidence that appears to be pointing in the same direction. I turn to that 
evidence in the next section.   
 
 
4. Polysemy and evidence for underspecified word meanings 
 
The work I am going to review here concerns the processing of words that have the prop-
erty of being ‘polysemous’, that is, broadly speaking, words that have multiple related 
senses (where that relatedness is apparent to users of the word). There seem to be at least 
two ways of viewing the phenomenon of ‘polysemy’, a pragmatic way and a semantic 
way. The various examples discussed in preceding sections, including ‘red’, ‘milk’, 
‘teaching’, ‘circle’, ‘raw’, and the verbs ‘pass’, ‘open’, ‘bear’, have all been shown to ex-
press different related meanings on different occasions of use. With regard to the process-
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es of utterance comprehension, this is arguably an ‘output’ phenomenon, the result of 
pragmatic processes of interpretation (hence pragmatic polysemy). There is another, prob-
ably more common, way of thinking about polysemy, which is as an ‘input’ phenomenon 
and so as applicable only to those instances where the distinct but related senses are fully 
conventionalised (hence semantic polysemy). Examples often cited are the animal/meat 
alternations for words like ‘lamb’, ‘chicken’ and ‘rabbit’, cases like ‘book’, ‘novel’, 
‘film’, ‘dvd’ which are regularly understood as either the physical object or the representa-
tional content, and numerous others where a metaphorical meaning has become very 
common and alternates with a literal meaning, e.g. adjectives like ‘cold’, ‘warm’, ‘hard’, 
‘soft’, ‘rigid’, ‘flexible’, ‘bright’, ‘dull’, and so on.  
 Pragmatic polysemy is surely the forerunner and source of semantic polysemy; 
while many cases of pragmatic polysemy will not become cases of semantic polysemy 
(many ad hoc concepts are one-off or at least too infrequent to become established senses), 
all cases of semantic polysemy must have arisen pragmatically (even if in some instances 
we are unsure which sense came first). A different way of putting what is essentially the 
same point is the following from Fodor & Lepore (2002: 117):  
‘Suppose it’s right that “lamb” is polysemous between the animal and the 
meat. Surely that’s because lamb-the-meat comes from lamb-the-animal. Sure-
ly there just couldn’t be a word that is polysemous between lamb-the-animal 
and (say) beef-the-meat? Or between lamb-the-animal and succotash-the-
mixed-vegetable? … Opportunities for polysemy arise from how things are in 
the world (or, anyhow, from how we take them to be).’   
Speakers are able to exploit these opportunities because they can rely on the propensity of 
words, when mentally accessed, to activate associated bodies of world 
knowledge/assumptions, thereby enabling hearers to pragmatically construct relevant con-
cepts that are distinct from, but related to, the concept(s) directly associated with the 
word.
13
 
 Let me turn now to the experimental work on polysemy by the psychologist Steven 
Frisson and his colleagues, which is of considerable interest for the hypothesis being con-
sidered here: that standing word meanings are non-conceptual (non-denotational). The 
point of departure for these polysemy studies was the existing abundant and robust exper-
imental results on the processing of homonymous lexical forms, e.g. ‘bank’ (with the two 
meanings: (i) a financial institution, (ii) a side of a river), ‘coach’ (with the two meanings: 
(i) an instructor, (ii) a large motor vehicle), that is, lexical forms which happen to map to 
two (or more) senses which are unrelated (at least as far as the language user is con-
cerned
14
). Summarising these results, when a hearer encounters such a form both mean-
                                                             
13   See also Bosch (2009), who maintains, similarly, that ‘polysemy has very little to do with lexical seman-
tics and compositionality. Polysemy is neither in the lexicon, nor does it arise from an interaction of differ-
ent words in a sentence. Instead, … polysemy effects come about when lexical information interacts with the 
denotation that an occurrence of a particular expression has in a particular context. Such interactions yield 
context-specific denotations for expressions, and it is these denotations that are the input for compositional 
processes, which eventually will give us something like the “meaning” of an utterance.’ (p.101). 
14  It could be that the meanings of some homonymous lexical forms are, in fact, etymologically related, 
something that would be noted in a well-researched dictionary, but this is irrelevant to their psychological 
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ings are briefly activated initially (but ranked according to frequency) and a decision is 
reached rapidly in favour of one or the other (on the basis of preceding context or, if the 
context doesn’t help, on the basis of frequency). In general, when the subordinate (less 
frequent) meaning is intended, more processing is required; in particular, when only sub-
sequent context indicates that the subordinate meaning is intended, a great deal of extra 
processing occurs, indicating that the wrong meaning had been selected initially. In short, 
language users make an early semantic commitment in that they immediately select one or 
other of the meanings. (For more detail, see Frisson & Pickering 2001; Pickering & Fris-
son 2001; Frisson 2009.) 
 In a series of experiments
15
, Frisson and colleagues have found evidence that the 
senses associated with polysemous words are processed differently from those associated 
with ambiguous lexical forms (homonyms)
16
 and the evidence points to what they call the 
‘Underspecification hypothesis’, which is why it is of interest here. The cases of polysemy 
they have tested are those that would generally be judged as conventional or well-
established, so nearer to the semantic end of the spectrum than to the one-off ad hoc con-
cept end. These include nouns with a concrete and a more abstract sense like ‘school’ (the 
building and the institution), and those with a figurative sense, whether metonymic as in 
(7a)-(7b) or metaphorical as in (7c)-(7d): 
 
(7) a.      The blasphemous woman will have to answer to the convent. 
 b.      A lot of Americans protested during Vietnam. 
 c.      He got on his bike and flew down the road. 
 d.      The speaker disarmed his critics with his wit and charm. 
 
What they found, in summary, was that polysemous words do not show an effect of the 
relative frequencies of the two senses, and no extra processing effort is found when it is 
the subordinate sense that is the relevant one (even when it is only subsequent context that 
makes this clear). In contrast with homonyms, polysemous words are not processed in 
ranked parallel fashion, that is, the different senses are not all activated at the same time 
with the strength of activation dependent on sense frequency followed by rapid selection 
on the basis of frequency or context. Rather, no immediate semantic commitment is made, 
that is, language users do not immediately select one or other of the senses (Frazier & 
Rayner 1990, Frisson 2009). For instance, when processing the word ‘flew’ in (7b), people 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
status.  If the individual language user stores the senses as two distinct, semantically unrelated, words then it 
is a case of homonymy (rather than polysemy).  
15  There is no space here to go into the details of the experimental designs and techniques used. Suffice it to 
say that the main methodology was eye-tracking, that is, the recording every few milliseconds of partici-
pants’ eye movements as they read texts, including the length of their eye-fixations on words and their re-
gressive eye movements to earlier sections of text. This technique enables the detection of those portions in 
a text that require more cognitive effort to understand than others. 
16
  This might seem unsurprising to those of us who see the two phenomena as radically different, the one a 
matter of accidental coincidence of form (phonological and/or graphological), the other transparently prag-
matically motivated. However, it has been claimed by other psycholinguists that polysemous words are in 
fact processed in the same way as homonyms and that, therefore, the different senses of a polysemous word 
are represented separately in the lexicon just like the distinct meanings of a homonymous form. For discus-
sion, see Frisson (2009: 118-120).  
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do not immediately access the two senses, the literal one which is the dominant (more fre-
quent) sense and the non-literal subordinate one, and rapidly select the latter on the basis 
of the context (riding a bicycle). Rather, the experimental evidence indicates that a single 
general meaning is accessed and this subsequently evolves into one or other of the more 
specific senses. On the basis of these findings (across a fair number of experiments testing 
different categories of words), Frisson and colleagues propose their ‘Underspecification 
hypothesis’:  
‘Rather than activating one or more specific senses, readers initially activate a 
single, semantically underspecified, meaning. This abstract meaning is the 
same for all established senses of a word, that is, the same underspecified 
meaning encompasses all semantically related interpretations of a word that 
are known to a reader.’ (Frisson 2009: 116) 
Once this underspecified meaning has been accessed, it can be followed by what they term 
a ‘homing-in’ stage in which context is used to arrive at one or other of the specific senses 
(see Frisson & Pickering 2001: 149; Frisson 2009: 117). 
 So the evidence from tracking people’s on-line language processing provides sup-
port for the position that polysemous words have a single underspecified abstract meaning 
representation distinct from any of the senses (or concepts) that comprise the polysemy. 
The question might then seem to be: what about words that are not polysemous? After all, 
interesting though these underspecification findings are, if they apply to only a subset of 
the vocabulary, their relevance to the central issue of this paper is limited. My claim in 
response to this would be that all open-class words are either polysemous or at least poten-
tially polysemous – that is the lesson to take from the pragmatic polysemies of section 2. 
In fact, even some closed-class words are polysemous (see Tyler & Evans (2001) on prep-
ositions) and so are some derivational affixes, e.g. ‘-er’, ‘-age’, ‘-ery’ (see Lieber (2004: 
179), who talks of these as ‘semantically underdetermined’ affixes, whose semantic con-
tribution may be realised in a number of ways depending on context). In short, polysemy 
is rampant and ubiquitous throughout the (non-syntactic) meaning-bearing elements of 
language. Evidence for an underspecified meaning for polysemous words is, then, evi-
dence for an underspecification account of the meaning of (open-class) words quite gener-
ally, so the findings reported here are entirely germane to the hypothesis that word type 
meanings are not fully conceptual. 
 It is worth being clear about terminology at this point: I am using ‘meaning’ for the 
underspecified (non-conceptual, non-semantic) standing meaning of a word and ‘sense’ 
for the fully conceptual semantic entities that words are used to express. Thus, I would 
suggest the following rewording of the statements above from Frisson and Pickering about 
the making of ‘semantic commitments’ by hearers when processing words: ‘An immediate 
meaning commitment is always made (for both homonymous and non-homonymous lexi-
cal forms), but an immediate semantic commitment is not made.’ This is best illustrated 
with a lexical form which is both homonymous and polysemous: the lexical form ‘bank’ 
maps onto two distinct ‘meanings’ (unrelated and underspecified), that is, there are two 
distinct words with the same phonological/orthographic form. Both of these words are 
polysemous (or at least potentially polysemous), e.g. the word ‘bank-1’ has an underspeci-
16 
 
fied meaning to do with financial matters and is associated with various different fully-
specified senses including the bank as a financial institution, as a physical building, as a 
company, as a group of managers and other personnel (e.g. ‘I talked to my bank this morn-
ing’).  
 Finally, let’s look briefly at the process that Frisson and Pickering talk of in terms 
of ‘homing-in’ on a specific sense.17 They maintain that context is not to be seen as a 
‘judge’ which selects among a number of senses/concepts but rather as an aid in develop-
ing a more specific interpretation of a word. This sounds entirely consistent with the view 
that I would advocate, as presented in section 2, that the process of arriving at the relevant 
(intended) sense of a word is pragmatic. However, the examples discussed in the work on 
lexical pragmatics involve the construction of ad hoc (occasion-specific) senses for which 
an inferential process is necessary, while many of the examples that Frisson and Pickering 
use are quite conventionalised, i.e. cases of ‘semantic’ polysemy (e.g. the two senses of 
‘school’ or ‘convent’ as buildings and as institutions; the literal and the metaphorical sens-
es of ‘fly’ and ‘disarm’). It seems unlikely that homing in on these senses requires the kind 
of fully inferential pragmatic process involved in deriving ad hoc senses/concepts, but ra-
ther something more like a short-circuited inference or pragmatic routine (see Vega More-
no (2007) on pragmatic routines from a relevance-theoretic perspective). Nevertheless, the 
point remains that while the underspecified meaning is directly accessed or selected, the 
sense expressed, even when quite conventionalised, is a matter of contextual (i.e. pragmat-
ic) specification of some sort. This is further supported by a discussion in Frisson and 
Pickering on the question of what is represented in the mental lexicon, whether it is both 
the single underspecified meaning and the various fully specified senses (which they call 
the ‘radical polysemy’ view) or just the underspecified meaning (which they call the ‘radi-
cal monosemy’ view).  Their view is that: ‘If we are correct that homing in on a specific 
interpretation involves using contextual information to refine an underspecified meaning 
rather than using context to guide the selection of an established sense, this would be more 
compatible with a monosemous account’ (Frisson & Pickering 2001: 166-67). Prima facie, 
this has the air of paradox: polysemy is monosemy!  But, of course, while ‘polysemy’ in-
volves a plurality of senses/concepts, ‘monosemy’ applies to singularity of meaning, not 
of sense.  
 There is doubtless a great deal more to be said about polysemy, about its subtypes 
and, in particular, about how to accommodate the continuum of degrees of frequen-
cy/conventionalisation of the senses that cluster round a word. My primary interest here, 
though, has been to show that there is a body of empirical work on the processing of open-
class words that seems to support the idea that standing word meanings are semantically 
underspecified, hence not fully conceptual.  
 
                                                             
17  Frisson and Pickering do not think that ‘homing-in’ on a specific sense always takes place: in some situa-
tions, the more schematic non-specific meaning representation may be good enough. They say that whether 
a specific sense is accessed or not probably depends on several factors, including how important the word is 
in the sentence (e.g., whether it has sentence focus), how much contextual evidence there is for a specific 
interpretation, and what the requirements of the task are (e.g. whether there is time pressure or whether a full 
understanding of every single word is essential). See Frisson (2009: 117).   
17 
 
 
5. Relevance theory and non-conceptual word meanings 
 
Before revisiting word meaning within relevance theory, it is instructive to consider, if 
only very briefly, what a minimalist semantics position entails about word meaning. In 
clear distinction from the position of relevance theory (and other varieties of pragmaticism 
or contextualism), semantic minimalism maintains (i) that natural language sentences have 
a truth-conditional semantics, that is, well-formed declarative sentences semantically ex-
press propositions, and (ii) that a hearer’s grasp of an utterance’s truth conditions is 
achieved with minimal, if any, reliance on context, whether linguistic or extra-linguistic. 
Minimalists do recognise, as they must, that languages contain ambiguous forms and in-
dexicals, which require that hearers look to context but, apart from these few cases, they 
take it that words are context-insensitive and their standing meaning makes a direct con-
tribution to truth-conditional content. The inevitable upshot of this view is that the mean-
ings of words must be concepts, that is, fully semantic entities which, when combined in 
the right way, are capable of yielding truth-evaluable content. As the staunch semantic 
minimalist Emma Borg puts it, ‘the contribution words make to sentences [is viewed] not 
as open-ended, web-like things which stand in need of contextual precisification prior to 
fixing their input to larger linguistic units, but rather as discrete, probably atomistic, blob-
like things.’ (Borg 2012: xvii) She fleshes this out in terms of what she calls ‘referential 
lexical axioms’, that is, axioms that pair a word with an element of the non-linguistic 
world, e.g. the lexical axiom ‘red refers to the property of being red’, adding that a full 
account would say that ‘word meanings are concepts and it is these concepts which stand 
in relation to objects in the world/have their content given by things in the world.’ (Borg 
2012:144)
18
 
 Borg’s minimalism is especially rigorous in that she insists that even demonstra-
tives (e.g. ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘there’, ‘then’) contribute a context-insensitive semantic content (a 
singular concept) to the sentences containing them. Other semantic minimalists allow a 
role for context, even for pragmatic maxims and inference, in determining the semantic 
content of indexicals and demonstratives.
19
 Nevertheless, the essence of all variants of 
minimalism is the same two properties: a propositional semantics for natural language 
sentences and very little context-sensitivity in the linguistic system. Open-class words, in 
particular, have a context-invariant semantics which entails that their standing meaning is 
conceptual, that is, they each contribute a determinate denotation to the truth-conditional 
content of every sentence in which they are a constituent. As discussed in section 1, I 
think that Grice was more minimalist than contextualist. He differs from contemporary 
minimalists in that he equated sentence semantics with what a speaker says, but, like them, 
he took sentence semantics to be propositional and, apart from disambiguation and fixing 
                                                             
18
  Borg (2012) tends to gloss over the role of concepts in the picture and to talk of words as relating directly 
to features of an external world because one of her primary concerns is to defend an externalist semantics 
against a raft of objections from advocates of a non-referential internalist semantics. 
19  For instance, the semantic minimalists Cappelen & Lepore (2005:148) see no problem in allowing speak-
er’s intentions to play a role in fixing the semantic value of context-sensitive expressions, while Borg insists 
that semantic content is entirely formally driven (that is, it runs exhaustively off syntax and lexicon).    
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of indexical referents, he mentioned no other role for context or pragmatics in identifying 
that propositional content. It looks very much as if he too would have viewed the standing 
meaning (or ‘conventional meaning’, as he tended to phrase it) of a word as a fully seman-
tic entity, hence a concept. 
 Unlike propositional minimalism, relevance theory is not bound to assume that 
words encode concepts. Given its basic premises that sentences do not encode 
thoughts/propositions and that pragmatic inference is essentially involved in the derivation 
of the explicature of an utterance, the way is open for word meanings to be something oth-
er than fully conceptual denotational entities.
20
 In fact, as mentioned earlier, relevance 
theorists have argued that a sizable subset of the vocabulary encodes something other than 
concepts: ‘procedures’ in some cases (e.g. ‘but’, ‘moreover’, ‘after all’, ‘anyway’, ‘well’); 
‘pro-concepts’ in other cases (e.g. ‘my’, ‘fast’, ‘near’, ‘do’).21 Nevertheless, Sperber and 
Wilson are quite clear that, in their view, the vast majority of open-class words encode 
concepts, which have a denotation, an externalist semantics, and so contribute directly to 
truth-conditional content. Here is a recent statement of that view: ‘the ideas evoked by the 
presence of a word in an utterance are likely to be true of items in the linguistically speci-
fied denotation of the word, or, equivalently, of items in the extension of the concept en-
coded by the word.’ (Sperber & Wilson 2008: 92). And this assumption about word mean-
ing has underpinned much of my own work on lexical pragmatics within the relevance-
theoretic framework (Carston 2002; Wilson & Carston 2007). In short, the standard RT 
position on these words is very similar to the minimalist semantic position: word mean-
ings are concepts and concepts have a referential semantics (with the wrinkle mentioned in 
footnote 5).  
 So the overall picture of (encoded) word meanings in RT is quite heterogeneous: 
procedures of various sorts, pro-concepts, and concepts (denotational entities), all of 
which provide input to the pragmatic interpretation process, and all of which, concepts 
included, function merely as clues or evidence guiding and constraining processes of 
pragmatic inference whose goal is the recovery of the intended interpretation of the utter-
ance. My suggestion is that the ‘concepts’ allegedly encoded by lexical forms are, in fact, 
conceptually underspecified meanings and that this meshes very well with the broader RT 
picture of lexical meaning and pragmatic processing. However, I want to keep these un-
derspecified meanings distinct from pro-concepts, which have an indexical element in 
their lexical meaning. That is, they come with a parameter or parameters that must be giv-
en a contextual value, e.g. the meaning of ‘my’ probably includes a speaker parameter and 
a ‘possession’ parameter, the contextual filling of which, on a particular occasion of utter-
                                                             
20  Again, the proviso here is that we need to give an account of how the move from the non-conceptual/non-
semantic to the conceptual/semantic is made. I believe this can be done and without needing vast changes to 
the lexical pragmatic story told in section 2, but I am not attempting it in this paper.   
21  There is work to be done in clarifying the differences between these two kinds of meaning. The key fea-
ture of pro-concepts is that they express concepts via an obligatory contextual specification of an indexical 
element contained in their lexical meaning. The inferential procedures associated with discourse connectives 
like ‘however’ are clearly distinct from these (see Blakemore 1987), but the term ‘procedure’ is now being 
used for a wider range of cases, including the meaning of pronouns, so it may be that pro-concepts are to be 
subsumed under this general label and that the taxonomic task ahead is to distinguish and characterise dif-
ferent subclasses of procedures.  
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ance of ‘my book’, could deliver a content of roughly the following sort: ‘THE BOOK 
MARY WROTE’, where Mary is the speaker of the utterance and the relevant ‘possession’ 
relation is the one between writer and thing written. The pragmatic process here is an in-
stance of what Recanati (2004) calls variable saturation and it is mandatory: that is, in no 
matter what context, the speaker variable and the ‘possession’ relation variable must both 
receive a value if the utterance is to be fully comprehended (and if it is to be fully proposi-
tional). The underspecified meanings of open-class words (e.g. ‘school’, ‘novel’, ‘milk’, 
‘run’, ‘open’, ‘fly’, ‘red’, ‘circular’, ‘flat’, ‘raw’) are different from these indexical words. 
First, the concepts they are used to express can differ from one another in arbitrarily many 
ways and their derivation depends on a wide array of different kinds of ordinary world 
knowledge which is unpredictable in advance of the utterance. Recall in this regard the 
different concepts of opening typically expressed by the following: ‘open the door’ (to let 
someone in), ‘open the door’ (to repair the lock), ‘open the package’, ‘open your mouth’, 
‘open your eyes’, ‘open someone else’s mouth (or eyes)’, ‘open the iceberg’, ‘we’ll have 
to open it’ (which has many possibilities depending on the referent of ‘it’), and so on, for 
everything that might, in some sense or other, be opened (and, of course, extra-linguistic 
context might well override the stereotypic or default mode of opening the object or entity 
denoted by the internal argument of ‘open’). Second, even if it were possible to set out the 
full range of parameters of variance, it would not be mandatory (or even possible) to pro-
vide all of them with a semantic value on every occasion of use as only a subset would be 
contextually relevant. For more detail on the differences between indexicals and these cas-
es of lexical meaning adjustment, see Recanati (2004: 94-95) and Bosch (2007, 2009).
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 I 
shall set aside indexicality and the notion of pro-concepts at this point and, for want of any 
better label, refer to the underspecified lexical meanings at issue here as ‘concept sche-
mas’ or ‘concept pointers’.  
 In a recent paper on the conceptual/procedural distinction, Deirdre Wilson (2011) 
has given much more weight and substance to the notion of procedural meaning in lexical 
semantics and has, in effect, suggested that all words encode a procedural component of 
meaning while some (the open classes) also encode a concept. Before looking more close-
ly at this idea, let me say a little more about ‘procedural’ meaning as it has been developed 
in Relevance Theory. When it was first introduced (by Blakemore 1987), procedural 
meaning was taken to apply just to discourse markers, such as ‘however’, ‘moreover’, 
‘still’, ‘yet’, ‘but’ and ‘anyway’, words that don’t appear to contribute anything descrip-
tive (truth-conditional) to the interpretation of an utterance. Blakemore proposed that what 
they do is provide a hearer with guidance on the kind of pragmatic inferences he is to per-
form in order to derive the intended implications (or implicatures) of an utterance. The 
notion of procedural meaning was extended in later work so as to encompass encoded 
constraints on other kinds of pragmatic tasks; for instance, it has been suggested that pro-
                                                             
22  Bosch (2009) distinguishes predicate indexicality from the kind of context-variable meaning of words 
that gives rise to polysemy. He discusses the adverb ‘nearby’ as a case of the former, the verb ‘open’ as a 
case of the latter, and the adjective ‘fast’ as a case where, as well as a lexically provided indexical element 
(for a comparison class), there is also this other kind of non-indexical context-dependence, which is not lexi-
cally specified but is wholly a matter of world knowledge and pragmatics. He provides some useful tests for 
distinguishing the two. 
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nouns encode procedural meaning which constrains the process of reference assignment, 
and that morphemes indicating grammatical moods, such as the indicative, the imperative, 
and the subjunctive, and modal particles (as in Japanese, for example) encode procedural 
meaning that constrains the pragmatic process of identifying the speaker’s attitude or de-
gree of commitment to the proposition she has expressed (Wilson & Sperber 1993; Wilson 
2011). In short, the utility and appeal of the notion of procedural word meaning has grown 
considerably since it was first introduced, the central idea being that it is non-conceptual 
and constrains or guides pragmatic inference. 
 Let’s move now to the new proposal in Wilson (2011), according to which ‘open-
class’ or ‘content’ words encode both a concept and a procedure. She cites a communica-
tion from Dan Sperber in which he mentions the possibility that all words with a concep-
tual meaning also encode ‘an instruction to inferentially construct an ad hoc concept using 
the encoded conceptual content as a starting point’. She endorses this suggestion and elab-
orates it as follows: 
‘On this approach, most words would encode some procedural content. Some 
would also encode conceptual content, whereas others (e.g. however) would 
not. Among words with both procedural and conceptual content, some (e.g. gi-
raffe) would automatically trigger a procedure for constructing an ad hoc con-
cept on the basis of the encoded concept, whereas others (e.g. unless) might 
encode a more specific procedure of the type familiar from Blakemore’s 
work.’ (Wilson 2011: 17).  
 
She goes on to mention some advantages of this account over the standard RT position 
according to which these words encode just a concept. One is that it would make sense of 
the recurrent claim, arising from work in lexical pragmatics, that words function as ‘point-
ers to’ or ‘pieces of evidence about’ the speaker’s meaning. Another is that it would dis-
solve a certain tension in the RT account of metaphorical and other nonliteral uses of 
words. The account has always rejected the Gricean treatment of nonliteral uses in terms 
of a flouting of a maxim of truthfulness and has maintained that it is not the case that the 
literal meaning (the encoded concept) is always the first to be considered as the correct 
interpretation and is only discarded in favour of another interpretation if it doesn’t meet 
certain pragmatic standards (of informativeness, relevance, etc).
23
 However, the worry is 
that, given that the relevance-based comprehension heuristic explicitly licenses hearers to 
follow a path of least effort in accessing and testing interpretations for relevance,
24
 it 
seems natural to suppose that the encoded concept, which is made instantly available by 
the word form, would be tried first and only pragmatically adjusted if it didn’t meet the 
required standards of relevance. The suggested move to incorporate into the meaning of 
content words a procedural component which requires that a relevance-driven process of 
concept construction is undertaken ensures that, although the encoded concept is activated 
                                                             
23  There is quite a lot of experimental evidence now that disconfirms the ‘literal first’ hypothesis; for discus-
sion, see Gibbs 1994, Giora 2003.  
24  In brief, the relevance-based comprehension heuristic says: (a) Follow a path of least effort in construct-
ing an interpretation of the utterance; (b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. For more 
detail, see Wilson & Sperber 2004, Sperber & Wilson 2012. 
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by the word uttered, it is not necessarily the first one to be composed into the interpreta-
tion.  
 This new conception of the meaning of open-class words as both conceptual and 
procedural raises a number of questions for me. First, it is difficult to see why a word that 
encodes a concept (a semantic entity with a ‘linguistically specified denotation’) would 
also encode a procedure that makes it obligatory for a hearer to build an ad hoc concept 
from the encoded one, especially when the encoded concept can, on occasion, be the con-
cept communicated (Sperber & Wilson 1998, 2008). Second,  the procedure involved 
would be identical across all the words which are taken to encode a concept, that is, the 
words ‘giraffe’, ‘milk’, ‘money’, ‘run’, ‘pass’, ‘raw’, ‘red’, and every other open-class 
word would all come with the same component of procedural meaning, namely, ‘Con-
struct an ad hoc concept based on the encoded concept’, which seems odd since, by and 
large, the lexical meanings of words are distinct from each other and this goes as much for 
procedural meaning as for conceptual meaning, e.g. the procedural meaning of the pro-
nouns ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘we’, ‘they’ is plainly distinct for each one, and linguists working 
on the procedural meaning of such closely related discourse connectives as ‘but’, ‘howev-
er’, ‘nevertheless’ and ‘although’ have put a lot of effort into pinpointing the fine differ-
ences in the inferential procedures they encode (see Blakemore 2002). Recognising the 
wide generality and recurrence of her proposed procedure, Wilson says that the procedure 
need not be attached to each word but rather could ‘be formulated at the level of the class 
[of ‘content’ words] rather than the individual word’ (2011: 18, n. 3). This might be feasi-
ble via some kind of lexical redundancy rule that says that, for every word that encodes a 
concept, there is a procedure to be followed of constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis 
of the given concept. Even so, it makes it very different from any of the more established 
elements of procedural meaning.   
 What really makes the proposal surprising to me, though, is that it seems entirely 
unnecessary on the relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation to issue instruc-
tions to the pragmatic system to construct ad hoc concepts. The goal of utterance interpre-
tation is to recover a speaker’s meaning, that is, the thought or thoughts she intends to 
communicate, where thoughts are structured arrays of concepts. On the account suggested, 
the words at issue encode concepts, so it is already evident that these words are contribu-
tors of concepts to the interpretation (as opposed to words like ‘moreover’ which do not 
encode anything conceptual). The general relevance-based comprehension heuristic takes 
care of the rest, that is, it ensures that the concepts recovered as speaker-meant are those 
that contribute to an optimally relevant interpretation, which may entail that the concept 
encoded is pragmatically adjusted (narrowed, broadened, or both), as discussed in section 
2 and in greater detail in Wilson & Sperber (2002, 2004). So, the idea that, in addition to 
all this, every open-class word comes with (or triggers) an instruction to build an ad hoc 
concept seems like overkill. 
 However, I think there is a way of capturing the desirable aspects of the proposal 
while avoiding these problems and that is to construe word meaning along the lines I have 
been considering in this paper. The hypothesis is that so-called ‘content’ words have a se-
mantically underspecified non-conceptual lexical meaning, that is, a concept schema (or 
conceptual pointer or indicator). On such an account, each word comes with its own dis-
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tinct but schematic meaning, which functions as a constraint on the general pragmatic pro-
cess of accessing or constructing a concept, a process which is wholly motivated by the 
goal of the pragmatic system which is to deliver speaker meaning. As the meaning provid-
ed by concept schemas is not fully conceptual, concept construction would be an obligato-
ry pragmatic process and, like the various proposals for other kinds of word meaning, e.g. 
inferential procedures which constrain implicature derivation, indexicals which constrain 
reference assignment, pro-concepts which constrain pragmatic completion processes (e.g. 
‘my’, ‘fast’), these concept schemas or pointers would be linked to a particular pragmatic 
process, namely ad hoc concept construction. This sort of account, assuming it can be 
properly worked out, is not prey to the problems I mentioned above for the concept-plus-
procedure account: it does not entail an obligatory process that is sometimes unnecessary 
(as when the encoded concept is the concept communicated), it doesn’t entail a component 
of lexical meaning that is the same for thousands of words (that is, the instruction to build 
an ad hoc concept) and it doesn’t formulate within the lexical semantics of a language a 
process (concept construction) that is entirely a matter of pragmatics. Furthermore, the 
advantages that Wilson discusses for the concept-plus-procedure account, are equally car-
ried by this concept schema account: it makes perfect sense of the idea that all words are 
merely pointers to or evidence for a speaker’s meaning, and, since there is no encoded 
concept (literal meaning), it allows for any one of a range of concepts to be the first one 
accessed or constructed, as determined by considerations of relevance (specifically, by the 
‘least effort’ part of the relevance-based comprehension heuristic).  
 As discussed in sections 3 and 4, there are further advantages to the concept sche-
ma (or pointer) approach too. First, because words don’t include full-fledged concepts on 
this sort of account, the issue of what exactly these concepts are, what they contribute to 
thoughts, what their denotations are, doesn’t arise. Recall, in this regard, the question 
about the general concept encoded by the verb ‘open’, as distinct from all the more specif-
ic concepts it is used to express and communicate. Second, the schematic meaning view 
provides a basis for understanding polysemy (the fact that bundles of related senses seem 
to accrue around a word form), which is a very prevalent phenomenon of language and yet 
seems resistant to adequate explanation within many accounts of word meaning.
25
 While 
Wilson’s concept-plus-procedure hypothesis would certainly account for pragmatic poly-
semy (the construction in context of new senses and the retrieval of recurrent but not fully 
conventional senses), the concept schema account of lexical meaning does that equally 
well and it does more: by locating all polysemy (semantic and pragmatic) outside the lexi-
con (that is, in the conceptual system) and providing just a schematic, underspecified lexi-
                                                             
25  An approach like Pustejovsky’s (1995) ‘generative lexicon’ has to import a great deal of general world 
knowledge into the lexicon and, even then, it succeeds in ‘generating’ only a small subset of polysemies (for 
insightful critiques, see Fodor & Lepore (1998) and Bosch (2009)).  And the minimalist semantic approach 
doesn’t seem to have the resources to distinguish polysemy from the different phenomenon of homonymy:  
word meanings on the minimalist approach are ‘referential atoms’, so it looks as if cases of highly conven-
tionalised polysemy, for instance, words like ‘school’, ‘newspaper’ and ‘disarm’, discussed above in section 
4, must be listed in the lexicon as a single lexical form with several distinct referential axioms, just as for 
homonyms like ‘bank’, ‘coach’ and ‘bug’. In a sustained account of word meaning within semantic minimal-
ism, Borg (2012) acknowledges the issues raised by polysemy (p. 172) and discusses and criticises existing 
approaches (pp. 177-89), but, as far as I can see, does not provide a minimalist solution.   
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cal meaning, it meshes neatly with experimental findings on the processing of polysemous 
words (Frisson 2009), as discussed in section 4.   
 Finally, I suggest that this non-conceptual account of word meaning accords better 
than an account that assumes words encode concepts (constituents of thoughts) with the 
following very recent reflection by Sperber and Wilson on the nature of linguistic mean-
ing:  
‘… as the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning widens, it in-
creasingly brings into question a basic assumption of much philosophy of lan-
guage, that the semantics of sentences provides straightforward, direct access 
to the structure of human thoughts. We have argued that linguistic meanings 
are mental representations that play a role at an intermediate stage in the 
comprehension process. Unlike speakers’ meanings (which they resemble in 
the way a skeleton resembles a body), linguistic meanings are not consciously 
entertained. In other words, whereas speakers’ meanings are salient objects in 
personal psychology, linguistic meanings only play a role in sub-personal 
cognition.’ (Sperber & Wilson 2012: 26-27; my emphases) 
 
 
6. Conclusion: What isn’t said and what cannot be said 
 
In this paper, I’ve made a preliminary case for treating the standing or encoded meanings 
of open-class words as semantically underspecified (non-conceptual), thus as different in 
kind from the fully semantic entities that words are used by speakers to express or com-
municate, that is, concepts, components of the thoughts (propositions) expressed. 
 I will conclude with a brief reflection on the way in which this view of word mean-
ing interacts with the wider linguistic underdeterminacy position and its implications for 
the semantic notion of ‘what is said’ (which consists of encoded or conventional sentence 
meaning with indexical references assigned). Among those who accept that sentence 
meaning typically underdetermines the proposition a speaker expresses and means (what 
she communicates explicitly), some take this to be an essential property of the relation be-
tween language and thought, while others take it to be merely a convenient effort-saving 
short-cut. According to the latter view, speakers could, by uttering more words, formulate 
their thoughts fully explicitly and thus ‘say’ what they mean, leaving nothing to the infer-
ential pragmatic capacities of their addressees.  For instance, Bach (1994) discusses a 
number of examples of sentences which when uttered require addressees to perform 
pragmatic processes of ‘completion’ (e.g. ‘Mary is ready’, ‘He has taken enough’) or ‘ex-
pansion’ (e.g. ‘I haven’t had breakfast’, ‘France is hexagonal’). According to him, ‘… 
what is being communicated could have been made fully explicit by the insertion of addi-
tional lexical material’ (Bach 1994: 134). So a speaker could have uttered ‘Mary is ready 
to leave for the airport’ or ‘France is approximately hexagonal’ and thus succeeded in say-
ing exactly what she meant. Speakers who choose to utter more abbreviatory sentences do 
so to save themselves some articulatory effort in situations where they can rely on their 
addressees to infer with ease the needed completion or expansion.  
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 In more recent work, Bach goes further in denying that there is any significant dif-
ference between thoughts and the meanings of natural language sentences: ‘… it is argua-
ble that all of our thoughts are explicitly expressible, in which case for every thought there 
is at least one sentence that would express it explicitly.’ (Bach 2010: 129). What this en-
tails is that, as well as a lot of semantically incomplete gappy sentences, useful for speedy 
conversational exchanges, public languages provide sentences which fully express 
thoughts, and, in fact, are rich enough to do this for all and any thoughts we may have. 
This is a very strong version of a principle of expressibility or effability, according to 
which sentences fully encode thoughts, modulo a small set of indexical words (‘I’, ‘you’, 
‘today’, ‘now’, ‘here’) whose content is fixed by a few parameters of semantic context 
(speaker, hearer, day of utterance, place of utterance), independent of any pragmatic con-
siderations. So while speakers may often mean more than they say and pragmatics may be 
needed to complete and expand what they said in order to arrive at the proposition they 
intended, they could, assuming they are fully linguistically competent, have found a sen-
tence the utterance of which would have expressed their thought fully and so required no 
pragmatic work on the part of their addressee. In short, language is such that, if they so 
chose, competent speakers could always say exactly what they mean.  
 Relevance theorists (e.g. Carston 2002, Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, 2012) and 
contextualists (e.g. Recanati 1994, 2004) have taken a very different view of linguistic un-
derdeterminacy, which is that it is essential, that is, that there are always components of a 
speaker’s meaning which the linguistic expressions she employs do not encode. Although 
the addition of more words may make a speaker’s primary meaning (her ‘explicature’) 
more explicit, full explicitness (full encoding of content) is quite generally not achievable. 
I won’t rehearse the arguments for this here (see the references just given), but simply 
point out that an account of word meanings as nonconceptual (semantically underspeci-
fied) would be the completing component of this view of the relation between language 
and thought: not only do sentence meanings underdetermine thoughts, but the basic con-
stituents of sentences (words) underdetermine the basic constituents of thoughts (con-
cepts). If this account turns out to be right, it’s not just that we don’t always say what we 
intend our hearers to take us to mean but that it is simply not possible to say what we 
mean.    
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